MATH 476 - Introduction to Game Theory

(3.00)

Purely non-cooperative or zero-sum games between two players are introduced. In simple cases, solutions of such games use techniques of saddle points or other geometric means. VonNeumann’s Min-Max theorem assures optimal mixed strategies. In general, linear programming techniques must be employed. Study of convex sets in Euclidean spaces, in particular of polyhedra, and polytopes is necessary for full understanding of the general case. In non-zero sum situations with two or more players, the fundamental results of John Nash assuring equilibria in mixed strategies and on arbitration or bargaining schemes are studied. For cooperative games with many players, several solution concepts are studied, including Shapley values and core allocations. Diverse application are considered. Purely noncooperative or zero-sum games between two players are introduced. Solutions of such entail techniques of finding saddle points or geometric means in simple cases.

Course ID: 55266
Consent: No Special Consent Required
Components: Lecture
Requirement Group: You must have completed MATH 221 and MATH 251 with a grade of C or better.